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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

The United States Supreme Court reasoned that Laidlaw's voluntary
cessation of its allegedly unlawful conduct did not suffice to moot the case.
It also found that the appellate court misperceived the remedial potential of
civil penalties. These penalties deter future violations and thereby redress
the injuries to the citizen. Additionally, the closing of the facility did not
moot the case because it was not clear whether it was reasonable to assume
that the permit violations would not recur.
Since the Supreme Court found that the case was not moot, it became
An
necessary to determine whether FOE had Article III standing.
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members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. The
Supreme Court found that individual members who, if not for the pollution
would otherwise use the river, had sufficient standing.
The CWA allows citizens to file suits enforcing NPDES permits.
Citizens lack standing when the violations have ceased prior to the filing of
the complaint. Additionally, the CWA bars a citizen from suing if the
Environmental Protection Agency or the State has already filed suit. The
mercury violations continued after FOE filed the complaint. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court found that the DHEC did not diligently prosecute the
original action against Laidlaw.
The Court reversed and remanded because it found that the case was
not moot and that FOE had sufficient standing.
Kristen L. Cassisa

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SECOND CIRCUIT
LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
waterway was navigable for jurisdictional purposes based on the
waterway's current, not historical use).
LeBlanc and Ossen's kayak collided with a recreational motorboat
operated by Cleveland and owned by Grant on the Hudson River. LeBlanc
and Ossen filed suit in federal court under federal admiralty jurisdiction
alleging Cleveland and Grant negligently caused the accident and resulting
injuries. Cleveland and Grant then brought third-party complaints against
the business ("JRD") that had rented the kayak to LeBlanc and Ossen.
This allowed the case to proceed as if LeBlanc and Ossen also sued JRD.
JRD moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court granted this motion because it found that the Hudson
River, at the site of the accident, was not navigable in fact, and, thus, the
court lacked admiralty jurisdiction over the lawsuit. LeBlanc and Ossen
then filed this appeal.
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
district court. At issue was the proper standard, and its application, for
determining navigability necessary to exercise federal admiralty
jurisdiction. The court cited the test established by the United States
Supreme Court regarding whether a tort action falls within the federal
courts' admiralty jurisdiction. This two-part test required that "[f]irst, the
alleged tort must have occurred on or over 'navigable waters.' Second, the
activity giving rise to the incident must have had a substantial relationship
to traditional maritime activity such that the incident had a potentially
disruptive influence on maritime commerce." Since the United States
Supreme Court had declared that "pleasure boat accidents have a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity," LeBlanc and Ossen
assigned error only to the district court's definition of "navigable waters."
The court agreed with the district court's use of the basic navigability
test for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction as set forth in the Daniel Ball
case. The test designated those rivers as navigable in fact and in law when
they might be used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce
with other states or foreign countries. The district court found that the part
of the Hudson River where the accident took place was not navigable
because it was disconnected from any interstate or international waterway
by numerous impassable rapids, falls, and artificial dams. LeBlanc and
Ossen did not dispute the applicability of the Daniel Ball test. Instead,
they argued that the test required navigability to be determined by the
waterway's historic, unimproved state, rather than its present, improved
state. If the historic navigability test were applicable, then the logging
industry's regular use of the portion of the river at issue, use which
occurred prior to 1951 and the construction of several impassable dams,
rendered the district court's finding of non-navigability error.
The court rejected LeBlanc and Ossen's argument in light of
subsequent United States Supreme Court case law and the policies served
by federal admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, the court held that a waterway was
"navigable for jurisdictional purposes if it is presently used, or is presently
capable of being used, as an interstate highway for commercial trade or
travel in the customary modes of travel on water. Natural and artificial
obstructions that effectively prohibit such commerce defeat admiralty
jurisdiction." In applying this legal standard, the court found that the
Hudson River at the accident site did not support commercial maritime
activity, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over LeBlanc and
Ossen's claims.
Vanessa L. Condra
United States v. Mango, 199 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
Clean Water Act allows the Secretary of the Army Corps of Engineers to
delegate authority to issue discharge permits to district engineers in the
Corps).
The United States appealed a judgment by the Northern District of
New York dismissing numerous counts of an indictment. The United

